Surprise is a ubiquitous concept describing a wide range of phenomena from unexpected events to behavioral responses. We propose a measure of surprise, to arrive at a new framework for surprise-driven learning. There are two components to this framework: (i) a confidence-adjusted surprise measure to capture environmental statistics as well as subjective beliefs, (ii) a surpriseminimization learning rule, or SMiLe-rule, which dynamically adjusts the balance between new and old information without making prior assumptions about the temporal statistics in the environment. We apply our framework to a dynamic decision making task and a maze exploration task to demonstrate that it is suitable for learning in complex environments, even if the environment undergoes gradual or sudden changes. Our proposed surprisemodulated belief update algorithm provides a framework to study the behavior of humans and animals encountering surprising events.
Introduction
Humans and animals rely on previously learned knowledge to guide their behavior. A crucial challenge when collecting new data in uncertain environments is the balance between new and old information. How much should we trust what we have learned in the past and how much should we adjust our model of the world based on newly acquired data? In noisy environments, individual data samples are not reliable and a model needs to average over the past data. However, when a structural change occurs in the environment the most recent data samples are the most informative ones and we would want to quickly forget what was learned in the past.
Both humans and animals adaptively adjust the relative contribution of old and newly acquired data on learning (1) (2) (3) (4) and rapidly adapt to changing environments (4) (5) (6) . To capture this behaviour existing models detect and respond to sudden changes using (absolute) reward prediction errors (4, 7), risk prediction errors (8, 9) , uncertainty-based jump detection (10, 11) and hierarchical modelling (1, 12) . The nature of the environmental change determines which of these models works best. Here we aim to generalize these approaches by using surprise as a trigger for shifting the balance between old and new information.
The Webster dictionary defines surprise as "an unexpected event, piece of information "and "the feeling caused by something that is unexpected or unusual "[merriam-webster.com].
Therefore, surprise is unexpectedness and represents the gap between what happens and what was expected to happen.
Behaviorally, surprise can be identified through startle responses (13) , which are vital for humans and animals. It manifests itself as physiological responses such as pupil dilation (2, 14) and tenseness in the muscles (13) , and can trigger fight-or-flight responses (15).
Neurally, the P300 component of event-related potential (16, 17) measured by electroencephalography is associated with violation of expectation (18, 19) . Surprising events have been shown to influence the development of the sensory cortex (20), and to drive attention (21), as well as learning and memory formation (22-24).
Quantities correlated to surprise have been previously used in machine learning. Planning to be surprised so as to maximize information gain has been suggested as an optimal exploration technique in dynamic environments (25, 26) . Signatures of surprise have been observed in artificial models of curiosity and interestingness both of which drive active exploration for learning unknown environments, in the absence of external reward (27) . Furthermore, a surprise measure defined as a prediction error has been optimized in the context of free energy minimization (28).
Surprise is difficult to quantify (21, 29-32). Inspired by information theoretic approaches we first introduce a measure of surprise to incorporate subjectivity and uncertainty, two conceptually different aspects of surprise. We formulate the principle of surprise minimization as a learning strategy and derive a class of learning rules which obey that principle. We then propose a surprise-modulated belief update rule that can be used for learning within changing environments. We apply our proposed method to a dynamic decision making task in a Gaussian environment, as well as an exploration task in a maze-like environment. We demonstrate how surprise and uncertainty interact with each other to make learning in changing environments possible. Finally, we discuss implications of surprise in reinforcement learning and link surprise and its role in learning/plasticity to existing neurophysiological evidence and behavioral data.
Theory
Surprise occurs whenever there is uncertainty, be it in the world or in the model that we build of the world. While the former corresponds to the probabilistic nature of the world, the latter is caused by an imperfect internal model of the outside world.
We emphasize that surprise is subjective: events that are surprising to me may not be surprising to you, although we may both have used the same data to build our models of the world.
Subjectivity may arise from different methods for building our internal models, or different prior beliefs about the world (29, 30). Model uncertainty differs from subjectivity in that the former refers to uncertainty in parameter estimation given the available data that remains even in the "best" model (e.g., Bayes-optimal). The latter incorporates individual differences in the construction of a (potentially suboptimal) model given identical data.
In order to quantify surprise, we assume that the world is governed by a set of parameters θ * chosen by nature. If θ * is known, the information content − ln p(X|θ * ) for a specific outcome X ∈ X is a measure of surprise (30-32) which says that the occurrence of a rare (i.e., unlikely to occur) data sample X is surprising. As the information content relates to the true probabilities p(X|θ * ) of samples in the real world, it is an objective, model-independent, measure of unexpectedness. However, the true set of parameters θ * , and so the true probability p(X|θ * ), is rarely known to the observer, such that it is difficult to evaluate the exact information content of a data sample X.
The Bayesian framework bypasses this issue by modeling the world as a joint distribution p(X, θ) = p(X|θ)π 0 (θ) which specifies how data X is generated if the model parameter is θ ∈ Θ. The prior distribution π 0 (θ) represents the current belief of the observer about the likelihood of the world having parameters θ. We define the raw surprise S raw (X; π 0 ) of a data sample X as
where we replaced the exact information content with a weighted average over all possible model parameters. In contrast to the information content, the raw surprise (1) is a subjective, model-dependent, measure of unexpectedness. Therefore, the same data point X might differently surprise different people, as they may have different beliefs π 0 (θ) about model parameters.
Confidence-corrected surprise
In addition to the raw surprise (1) being subjective we would also like to capture the impact of a subject's confidence in her belief. Intuitively, if we are uncertain about what to expect (because we have not yet learned the structure of the world), receiving a data sample that occurs with low probability under the present model is less surprising than a low-probability sample in a situation when we are almost certain about the world (see Fig.1A ). Our confidence about the current model of the world is represented by the entropy H(π 0 ) = − Θ π 0 (θ) ln π 0 (θ)dθ of our current belief about the model parameters. To arrive at the confidence-corrected surprise, we first subtract the entropy H(π 0 ) of our current belief from the raw surprise, i.e.,
While the right-hand side of equation (2) is reminiscent of a KL divergence (between π 0 (θ) and p(X|θ) as a function of θ), the likelihood function p(X|θ) is not a correctly normalized probability distribution function with respect to θ. To rewrite equation (2) as a KL divergence, we divide the likelihood p(X|θ) by a scaling factor ||p X || = Θ p(X|θ ) dθ . The scaled like-
can be considered as a probability distribution function over θ, just like the prior π 0 (θ). The normalization corresponds to calculating the posterior under a flat prior
] is a well-defined quantity, which we use to define the confidence-corrected surprise
The confidence-corrected surprise measure (3) represents the difference between what we expected to happen (as indicated by the current belief π 0 (θ)) and what actually happened in the world: the relevance of a new data point X is indicated by the (scaled) likelihoodp X (θ). As such we have defined a surprise measure that meets our requirements: a subjective, confidence-adjusted measure of the difference between expectation and realization. We emphasize that the confidence-corrected surprise is evaluated for each data point X separately.
Surprise minimization: the SMiLe-rule
Successful learning implies an adaptation to the environment such that an event occurring for a second time is perceived as less surprising than the first time. In the following surprise minimization refers to a learning strategy which modifies the internal model of the external world such that the unexpected observation becomes less surprising if it happens again in the near future. Surprise minimization is akin to -though more general than -reward prediction error learning. Reward based learning modifies the reward expectation such that a recurring reward results in a smaller reward prediction error. Similarly, surprise-minimization learning results in a smaller surprise for recurring events.
To mathematically formulate learning through surprise minimization, we define a learning rule L(X, π 0 ) as a mapping from a prior belief π 0 (θ) to a posterior belief q(θ) after receiving data sample X, i.e., q = L(X, π 0 ). Moreover, we define a belief update as the learning step after a single data sample.
We define the class L of plausible learning rules as the set of those learning rules L for which the surprise S(X; q) of any data sample X under the posterior belief q(θ) is at most as surprising as the surprise S(X; π 0 ) of that data sample under the prior belief π 0 (θ), i.e.,
In other words, if the same data sample X occurs a second time right after a belief update, it is perceived as less surprising than the first time.
After the belief update we can measure how much the new data X has impacted the internal model by comparing the surprise of data sample X under the posterior belief to its surprise under the prior belief:
Given a learning rule L, a data sample X is considered more effective for a belief update than X , if ∆S(X; L) > ∆S(X ; L). Note that definitions (4, 5) do not depend on our specific choice of surprise measure S. In the following we choose S to be the confidence-corrected surprise S corr (3).
The impact function ∆S corr (X; L) (5), for a given data sample X, is maximized by the learning rule that maps the prior belief π 0 (θ) to the scaled likelihoodp X (θ). However, as this posterior distribution q =p X does not depend on the prior belief π 0 , it discards all previously learned information. Therefore, it amounts to a valid though meaningless solution.
To avoid overfitting to the last data sample, we need to limit our search to posteriors q that are not too different from the prior π 0 . This limited set can be expressed as the set of posteriors q that fulfill the constraint D KL [q||π 0 ] ≤ B, for some non-negative upper bound B ≥ 0. The parameter B determines how much we allow our belief to change after receiving a data sample X. Maximizing the impact function ∆S corr (X; L) under such a constraint, is equivalent to the following constraint optimization problem:
Using the method of Lagrange multipliers we find the solution of problem (6) to be
where Z(X; γ) = Θ p(X|θ) γ π 0 (θ) 1−γ dθ is a normalizing factor and 0 ≤ γ ≤ 1 is uniquely determined by the bound B (see Appendix B for the proof). The unique relationship between γ and B means that once B has been chosen, γ is no longer a free parameter and vice versa.
We call the learning rule (7) surprise minimization learning (SMiLe). It is reminiscent of Bayes' rule except for the parameter γ which modulates the relative contribution of the likelihood p(X|θ) and the prior π 0 (θ) to the posterior q(θ). Note that the SMiLe rule belongs to the class L of plausible learning rules, for all 0 ≤ γ ≤ 1.
Choosing γ in the range 0 ≤ γ ≤ 1 is equivalent to choosing a bound B ≥ 0. To understand how the optimal solution (7) -and thus γ -relates to the boundary B, we illustrate its limiting cases (see Fig. 1B ): (i) B = 0 yields γ = 0 and the posterior q is identical to the prior π 0 .
In other words, the new information is discarded.
( q. This is equivalent to the unconstrained case, and implies that all previous information is discarded. (iii) For 0 < B < B max the optimal solution is the posterior q γ , Eq. (7), with
Moreover, B > B implies γ > γ (see Fig. 1B ).
While the SMiLe rule (7) depends on a parameter γ which is uniquely determined by the bound B we have yet to indicate how to choose B. Highly surprising data should result in larger belief shifts. As such, the bound B should increase with the level of surprise. We choose a simple monotonic function to link the bound to the surprise. In the following, for each data sample X, we take
where
Here, the monotonic function depends on a subject-specific parameter m that describes an organism's propensity toward changing its belief. Note that in Eq. (8) m = 0 indicates that the subject will never change her belief. As m increases so does a subject's willingness to change her belief. Thus, differences in m from one subject to the next will eventually allow us to capture heterogeneity in belief update strategies.
The exact link between the bound and surprise is not crucial as long as B is monotonic in surprise in a reasonable way. Note that biological correlates of surprise such as pupil dilation or the activity of a neuromodulator will normally saturate at some maximal value -consistent with our choice of a saturating function in Eq. (8).
Surprise-modulated belief update
The surprise-modulated belief update combines the confidence corrected surprise (3) and the SMiLe rule (7) to dynamically update our belief: after receiving a new data point X, we evaluate the surprise S corr (X; π 0 ) which sets the bound for our update and allows us to solve for γ. We then update the belief, using the SMiLe rule (7) with parameter γ (see Algorithm 1). X n ← a new data sample 6: (i) evaluate the surprise S corr (X n ; Belief), Eq. (3) 7:
(ii-a) calculate
(ii-b) choose the bound B(X n ) = mScorr(Xn;Belief) 1+mScorr(Xn;Belief)
(iv) update using SMiLe, Eq. (7):
Note 1: In each iteration, we first calculate the surprise, step (i), before the model is updated in step (iv). Note 2: The steps (ii-a), (ii-b), and (iii) can be merged and approximated by γ = f (S corr (X n ; Belief)) where f (.) is a subjective function that increases with surprise.
The parameter γ in the SMiLe rule (7) controls the impact of a data sample X on belief update such that a bigger γ causes a larger impact. More precisely, the impact function
, where L is replaced by the SMiLe rule (7) , is an increasing function of γ (see Appendix C for the proof).
We note that in classical models of perception and attention (21, 29), surprise has been defined as a measure of belief change (such as D KL [q γ ||π 0 ] or its mirror form D KL [π 0 ||q γ ]). We emphasize that our model of surprise is "fast" in the sense that it can be evaluated before the beliefs are changed. Interestingly, the impact function is linked to the measures of belief change by the following equation (see Appendix D for derivation),
Therefore a larger reduction in the surprise implies a bigger change in belief.
Simulations
In the following we will look at two examples to illustrate the functionality of our proposed surprise-modulated belief update algorithm 1. The first is a simple, one-dimensional, dynamic decision making task which has been used in behavioral studies (1, 2) of learning under uncertainty. While somewhat artificial as a task, it is appealing as it nicely isolates different forms of uncertainty. This allows us to (i) demonstrate the basic quantities and properties of our algorithm and (ii) show how its flexibility allows it to capture a wide range of behaviours. The second example is a multi-dimensional maze-exploration task which we will use to demonstrate how our algorithm extends to and performs in more complex and realistic experimental environments.
Gaussian estimation
Task. In the one-dimensional dynamic decision making task subjects are asked to estimate the mean of a distribution based on consecutively and independently drawn samples. At each time step n, a data sample X n is drawn from a normal distribution N (µ n , σ 2 x ) and the subject is asked to provide her current estimateμ n of the mean of the distribution. Throughout the experiment, the mean may change without warning ( Fig. 2A) . Changes occur with a hazard rate 0.066. The variance σ 2 x remains fixed.
Model.
We model the subject's belief before the n-th sample X n is observed, as the normal distribution N (μ n−1 , σ 2 n−1 ) whereμ n−1 is the estimated mean and σ 2 n−1 determines how uncertain the subject is about her estimation. In order to keep the scenario as simple as possible, we assume σ
The posterior meanμ n resulting from the surprise-modulated belief update (algorithm 1) is a weighted average of the prior meanμ n−1 and the new sample X n (see
The weight factor, that determines to what extent a new sample X n affects the posterior meanμ n , is determined by γ which increases with the surprise S corr (X n ) of that sample ( Fig.   2B ), i.e.,
Note that in this example, the confidence-corrected surprise measure is related to the normalized unsigned prediction error |X n −μ n−1 |/σ x . This outcome of our SMiLe-update is consistent with recent approaches in reward learning that suggest to use reward prediction errors scaled by standard deviation or variance (8) .
Results. The confidence-corrected surprise increases suddenly in response to the samples immediately after the change points, as they are unexpected under the current prior. As a consequence, surprising samples increase the influence of a new data sample on the posterior mean ( Fig. 2B ). We can compare our surprise modulated belief update in Eqs. (10), (11) with a delta-rule (10) with constant weighting factor γ. To enable a fair comparison we consider two situations: (i) we arbitrarily fix γ at 0.5 or (ii) for a given hazard rate H we first search for the optimal value of fixed γ so as to minimize the estimation error (Fig. 2C ). We find that our surprise-modulated belief update outperforms the delta-rule with any constant learning rate (Fig. 2D ). This clearly shows that an adaptive learning rate is preferable to a fixed learning rate.
We also compared our proposed algorithm with a delta-rule that approximates the optimal Bayesian solution (10) . In the optimal model the subjects knows a-priori that the mean will change at unknown points in time, leading to a hierarchical statistical model of the world.
The algorithm proposed in (10) provides an efficient approximate algorithm to estimate the parameters of the hierarchical model. In this algorithm, the subject increases the learning rate as a function of probability of encountering a change point at a given time step. This probability requires knowledge or online estimation of the hazard rate, which indicates how frequently change points occur. Although our surprise-modulated belief update does not outperform the approximate Bayesian delta-rule, the difference in performance is, in most cases, not significant (see Fig. 2D ). In other words, our method, which does not require any information about the hazard rate, can approximate the quality of the optimal Bayesian solution, with significantly reduced computational complexity.
Maze exploration
Task. The maze exploration task is similar to tasks used in behavioral neuroscience and robotics (33-35). There are two environments A and B each composed of the same uniquely labeled (e.g., by colors or cue cards) rooms. A and B only differ in the topology / spatial arrangement of rooms (see Fig. 3 ). Neighboring rooms are connected and accessible through doors. Initially, the agent is placed into either A or B. At each time step a door of the current room opens and the agent moves into the adjacent room, thus exploring the environment. After a random exploration time the environment is switched. Once it is changed, the agent must quickly adapt to the new environment. Note that this task differs from a reinforcement learning task because the task at hand just consists of the exploration phase. In particular, there is no reward involved in learning.
Model. We model the knowledge of the environment by a learning agent that updates a set of parameters α(s,š) ≥ 1 used for describing its belief about state transitions from s ∈ {1, 2, ..., 16} toš ∈ {1, 2, ..., 16}\s, where 16 is the number of rooms. More precisely, an agent's belief about how likely it is to visitš, given the current state s, is modeled by a Dirichlet distribution parametrized by a vector of parameters α(s) ∈ R 15 . The components of the vector α(s) are denoted as α(s,š).
The surprise-modulated belief update (algo 1), with the Dirichlet distribution inserted, yields algorithm 2 for the maze exploration task (see Appendix F for derivation). Immediately after a transition from the current state s to the next state s , the posterior belief q γ obtained by the SMiLe rule (7) is a Dirichlet distribution α new (s) with components
, that can be written as a weighted average of the parameters of the prior belief π 0 (i.e., α old (s,š)) and those of the scaled likelihoodp
indicates a number that is 1 if the condition in square brackets is satisfied, and 0 otherwise.
In order to see how well our proposed surprise-modulated belief update algorithm performs in this task, we compare it with a naive Bayesian learner and an online expectationmaximization (EM) algorithm (36). While in the former the agent assumes that there is only a single stable, but stochastic environment, the latter benefits from knowing the true hidden Markov model (HMM) of the task and approximates the optimal hierarchical Bayesian solution (see Appendix G).
Results. Similar to the Gaussian mean estimation task, surprise is initially high and slowly decreases as the agent learns the topology of the environment (Fig. 4A ). When the environment is switched, the sudden increase in the surprise signal ( Fig. 4A ) causes the parameter γ to increase ( Fig. 4B ). This is equivalent to discounting previously learned information and results in a quick adaptation to the new environment. To quantify the adaptation to the new environment, we compare the state transition probabilities of the current model with the true transition probabilities of the two environments. We find that the estimation error of the state transition Algorithm 2 Surprise-modulated belief update for the maze exploration task 1: N ← number of data samples 2: α(s,š) = 1, ∀s ∈ {1, 2, ..., 16},š ∈ {1, 2, ..., 16}\{s} (a uniform prior belief) 3: m ← 0.1 (subject-dependent) 4 : Start in state s 5: for n: 1 to N do # at this time step we only update the parameters that describe state transitions from the current state s to all possible next statesš ∈ {1, 2, ..., 16}\{s}. The prior belief, for the state s, is π 0 ∼ Dir(a), a ∈ R 15 , a(š) = α(s,š).
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probabilities in the new environment is quickly reduced after the switch points (Fig. 4C) . Following a change point, the model uncertainty, measured as the entropy of the current belief about the state transition probabilities, increases indicating that the current model of the topology is inaccurate (Fig. 4D) . A few time steps later the uncertainty slowly decreases, indicating
increased confidence in what is learned in the new environment.
If we look more closely at the model parameters, we find that the surprise-modulated belief update (algorithm 2) enables the agent to adjust the estimated state transition probabilities. In Surprise-modulated belief update is a method of quick learning. How well does our SMiLe update rule perform to other existing models? We compared it with two well-known models.
First, a naive Bayesian learner which tries to estimate the 240 state transition probabilities, by Bayes rule. Note that, by construction, the naive Bayesian learner is not aware of the switches between the environments. Second, a hierarchical statistical model that reflects the architecture of the true world as in Fig. 3 . The task is to estimate the 2 × 240 state transitions in the two environments as well as transition probabilities between the environments p A→B and p B→A by an online EM algorithm.
For the naive Bayesian learner, we find that its behavior indicates a steady increase in certainty, regardless of how surprising the samples are. In other words, it is incapable of changing its belief after it has sufficiently explored the environments (Fig. 4C) . The state transition probabilities are estimated by averaging over the true parameters of both environment, where the weight of averaging is determined by the fraction of time spent in the corresponding environ-ment (Figs. 5E, 5F).
The comparison of our surprise modulated belief update with the online EM algorithm for the hierarchical Bayesian model associated with the switching environments, provides several insights (see Fig. 6 ). First, already after less than 1000 time steps, the estimation error for environment A during short episodes in environment A drops below E A = 0.002. Only after 10000 time steps, the online EM algorithm achieves the same level of accuracy. While the solution of the SMiLe rule in the long run is not as good, our algorithm benefits from a reduced computational complexity and simpler implementation.
To further investigate the ability of an agent to adapt to the new environment after a switch,
we analyzed performance as a function of two free parameters that control the setting of the task:
(i) the fraction of time spent in environment A, and (ii) the average time spent in environment A before a switch to B occurs. To do so, we calculate the average estimation error in state transition probabilities 64 time steps after a switch occurs. We consider only those switches after which the agent stays in that environment for at least 64 time steps. Note that 64 is the minimum number of time steps that is required to make sure that all possible transitions from 16 room to their 4 neighbors could occur. A smaller estimation error for a given pair of free parameters indicates a faster adaptation to the new environment for that setting.
We found that the surprise-modulated belief enables an agent to quickly readjust its estimation of model parameters, even if the fraction of time spent in an environment is relatively short. In that sense, it behaves similarly to the approximated hierarchical Bayesian approach (online EM algorithm). This is not, however, the case for a naive Bayesian learner whose estimation error in each environment depends on the fraction of time spent in that corresponding environment (see Fig. 7 ).
The naive Bayesian learner suffers from low accuracy in estimation and cannot adapt to environmental changes. A full hierarchical Bayesian model, however, requires prior informa-tion about the task and is computationally demanding. For example, the computational load of the hierarchical Bayesian model increases with the number N of environments between which switching occurs. The surprise-modulated belief update, however, balances accuracy and computational complexity: computational complexity remains, by construction, independent of the number of switched environments.
Discussion
Surprise is a widely used concept describing a range of phenomena from unexpected events to behavioral responses. Existing approaches to quantifying surprise are either data-centered (30-32) or model-centered (29, 37) and may be objective (31, 32) or subjective (29, 30, 37) but are always linked to uncertainty. We emphasize that, in order for surprise to be behaviorally meaningful, it has to be defined for a single data sample such that an organism can respond to a single event. In contrast, information theoretic quantities, such as data entropy and mutual information, are usually defined as average quantities.
Based on our definition of surprise, we proposed a new framework for surprise-driven learning. There are two components to this framework: (i) a confidence-adjusted surprise measure to capture environmental statistics as well as subjective beliefs, (ii) the surprise-minimization learning rule, or SMiLe-rule, which dynamically adjusts the balance between new and old information without prior assumptions about the temporal statistics in the environment. Within this framework, the surprise is a single subject-specific variable that determines a subject's propensity to modify existing beliefs. This algorithm is suitable for learning in complex environments that are either stable or undergo gradual or sudden changes. The latter are signaled by high surprise and result in placing more weight on new information. The significance of the proposed method is that it neither requires knowledge of the full Bayesian model of the environment nor any prior assumption about the temporal statistics in the environment. Moreover, it pro-vides a simple framework that could potentially implemented in a neurally plausible way using probabilistic population codes (38, 39).
Relation to Bayesian surprise
One of the existing approaches for measuring surprise is Bayesian surprise (21, 29) which is generally defined as a distance or dissimilarity measure between prior and posterior beliefs.
According to this measure, a data sample X is more surprising than a data sample X if it causes a larger change in the subject's belief. One of the shortcomings of the Bayesian surprise is that it is computed only after learning (i.e., once we have changed our belief from prior to posterior). However, behavioral and neural responses indicate that surprise is concurrent with the unexpected event. Our working hypothesis is that the brain evaluates surprise even before recognition, inference or learning occurs. We thus need to evaluate surprise before we update our belief such that surprise may control learning rather than emerge from it. This property is fulfilled in the confidence-corrected surprise measure introduced in this paper.
Information content and Bayesian surprise are two distinct yet complementary approaches to measuring surprise. Information content is about data as it captures the inherent unexpectedness of a piece of data given a model. While its calculation is instantaneous and objective, it suffers from not knowing the true underlying parameter θ * . Bayesian surprise is about a model. Since it measures the change in belief (i.e., in the model parameters), it is subjective and does not require knowing θ * . However, it is computed only after learning, which is inconsistent with behavioral and neural data that suggest an instantaneous response to surprise. Our definition of raw surprise combines these two measures to use their complementary benefits and overcome their shortcomings (see Appendix H).
New versus old information
The proposed algorithm's performance is primarily driven by two features: (i) the algorithm adaptively increases the influence of new data on the belief update as a function of how surpris-ing the data was; (ii) the algorithm increases model uncertainty in the face of surprising data thus increasing the influence of new data on current and future belief updates. The importance of the first point has been recognized and incorporated previously (2, 4) . The second point is particularly worth noting: a surprising sample not only signals a potential change, it also signals that our current model may be wrong, so that we should be less certain about its accuracy. This increase in model uncertainty implies discounting the influence of past information in current and future belief updates.
Both humans and animals adaptively adjust the relative contribution of old and newly acquired data on learning (1-4) and rapidly adapt to changing environments (4-6). Standard
Bayesian and reinforcement learning models in humans (40) or animals (41, 42) assume a stable environment and are slow to adapt to sudden changes in the environment. To quickly learn in dynamic environments, models need to include a way to detect and respond to sudden changes.
A full (hierarchical) Bayesian approach works only if the subject is aware of the correct model of the task, (e.g., the time scale of change in the environment or the number of environments between which switches occur). Calculating the probability of a change point in a Gaussian estimation task (10) , estimating the volatility of the environment in a reversal learning task (1), and dynamically forgetting the past information with a controlled time constant (43) are all examples of addressing learning in changing environments without explicit knowledge of the full Bayesian model.
In changing environments, hierarchical Bayesian models outperform the standard delta-rule with a fixed learning rate. However, hierarchical models either make assumptions about how fast the world is changing on average or about the underlying data generating process, in order to accurately detect a change in the environment. While our proposed surprise-based algorithm may not be theoretically optimal, it approximates the optimal (hierarchical) Bayesian solution without making any such assumption.
Model uncertainty
The ability of our proposed method to increase model uncertainty solves a common problem in standard Bayesian learning, namely, a model uncertainty or a learning rate approaching zero when the number of data samples increases. This is particularly prominent in Bayes' rule which is derived under the assumption of stationarity and which thus reduces posterior uncertainty in each step no matter how surprising a sample is. The SMiLe rule (7) guarantees that a small model uncertainty remains even after a long stationary period. This remaining uncertainty ensures that an organism can still detect a change even after having spent an extensive amount of time in a given environment (see Fig. 4C ). One might argue, that reducing the learning rate to zero after extensive training is desirable under certain conditions as it corresponds to the welldocumented phenomenon of overtraining whereby an organism no longer responds to changes in goal value. We would argue that this insensitivity is a consequence of behavioral control being handed over to the habitual system and thus to a different neural substrate (44-46).
Potential applications
Surprise minimization is a more general approach for learning than learning by reward prediction error. Recent approaches in reward learning suggest to use a scaled reward prediction error (8) . A recurring problem in reward-based learning is the observation that subjects use different learning rates on a trial-by-trial basis even in stable environments. Researchers typically assume an average learning rate for fitting data. Note that in our approach, the learning rate varies naturally as a function of the last data point (as it should) while keeping the subjectspecific parameter m constant.
Note that both confidence-corrected surprise and the SMiLe rule have wide-reaching implications outside the framework presented here. On the one hand, our surprise measure can not only modulate learning, but can be used as a trigger signal for an algorithm that needs to choose between several uncertain states or actions as is the case in change point detection (10, 43, 47), 
Experimental predictions.
There is ample evidence for a neural substrate of surprise. Existing measures of expectation violations such as absolute and variance-scaled reward prediction errors (54, 55), unexpected uncertainty (56) and risk prediction errors (9) have been linked to different neuromodulatory systems. Among those, the noradrenergic system has emerged as a prime candidate for signalling unexpected uncertainty and surprise: noradrenergic neurons respond to unexpected changes such as the presence of a novel stimulus, unexpected pairing of stimulus with a reinforcement during conditioning, and reversal of the contingencies (57-60). The P300 component of ERP (16, 17) which is associated with novelty (61) and surprise (18) is modulated by Noradrenaline (NE). It also modulates pupil size (62, 63) as a physiological response to surprise. The dynamics of noradrenergic system is fast enough to quickly respond to unexpected events (64-66), a functional requirement for surprise to control learning; see (53, 67, 68) for a review. We predict that, in experiments with changing environments, the activity of NE should exhibit a high correlation with the confidence-corrected surprise signal.
Note that Acetylcholine (ACh), on the other hand, is a candidate neuromodulator for encoding expected uncertainty (56) and thus is linked to the model uncertainty (although it might also be linked to other forms of uncertainty such as environmental stochasticity).
A variety of experimental findings are consistent with and can be explained by our definition of confidence-corrected surprise and the SMiLe rule. It has been shown both theoretically (56) and empirically (69) that NE and ACh interact such that ACh sets a threshold for NE to indicate fundamental changes in the environment (56). This is consistent with our hypothesis that if an agent is uncertain about its current model of the world, unexpected events are perceived less surprising than when the agent is almost certain about its model (the idea behind the confidencecorrected surprise). The impairment of adaptation to contextual changes due to NE depletion (70) can be explained by incapability of subjects in responding to surprising events signaled by NE. The absence/suppression of ACh (low model uncertainty) implies little or no variability of the environment such that even small prediction error signals are perceived as surprising (71), consistent with the excessive activation of NE system in such situations.
Moreover, there is empirical evidence that NE and ACh both affect synaptic plasticity in the cortex and the hippocampus (69, 72), suppress cortical processing (73, 74) and facilitate information processing from thalamus to the cerebral cortex (75-77). This is consistent with our theory that surprise balances the influence of the newly acquired data (thalamocortical pathway) and old information (corticocortical pathway) during belief update.
In summary, we proposed a measure of surprise and a surprise-modulated belief update algorithm that can be used for modeling how humans and animals learn in changing environments.
Our results suggest that the proposed method can approximate an optimal Bayesian learner, but with significantly reduced computational complexity. 
A. The impact of confidence on surprise. Top: Two distinct internal models (red and blue), described by joint distributions p(x, θ) (contour plots) over observable data x and model parameters θ, may have the same marginal distribution Z(x) = θ p(x, θ)dθ (distributions along the x-axis coincide) but differ in the marginal distribution π 0 (θ) = x p(x, θ)dx (distributions along the θ-axis). Surprise measures that are computed with respect to Z(x) neglect the uncertainty as measured by the entropy H(π 0 ). Therefore, a given data sample X (green dot) may equally be surprising in terms of the raw surprise S raw (X) (1) but results in higher confidence-corrected surprise S corr (X) (3) for the blue as compared to the red model, because π 0 in the red model is wider (corresponding to a larger entropy) than in the blue model. Bottom: The scaled likelihoodp X (θ) (magenta) for the "red" internal model is calculated by evaluating the conditional probability distribution functions p(x|θ i ) (specified by different color for each θ i ) at x = X (intersection of dashed green line with colored curves). The confidencecorrected surprise S corr (X) is the KL divergence betweenp X (θ) (bottom, magenta) and π 0 (θ) (top, red). B. Solutions to the (constraint) optimization problem (6). The objective function, i.e. the posterior surprise S corr (X; q) (black) for a given data sample X, is a parabolic landscape over γ where each γ corresponds to a unique posterior q γ . Its global minimum is at γ = 1 (corresponding to q 1 =p X ) which is equivalent to discarding all previously observed samples. The boundary B constrains the range of γ and thus the set of admissible posteriors. At B = 0 no change is allowed resulting in γ = 0 with a posterior equals to the prior π 0 (green).
(red dashed line) implies that we allow posteriors that are further away from the prior than the sample itself so the optimal solution is the scaled likelihoodp X or γ = 1 as for the unconstrained problem. For 0 < B < B max (blue dashed line) the objective function is minimized by q γ (Eq. 7) that fulfills the constraint D KL [q γ ||π 0 ] = B with 0 < γ < 1. Gaussian mean estimation task. At each time step, a data sample X n is independently drawn from a normal distribution whose underlying mean may change within the interval [−20, 20] at unpredictable change points. On average, the underlying mean remains unchanged for 15 time steps corresponding to a hazard rate H = 0.066. The standard deviation of the distribution is fixed to 4 and is assumed to be known to the subject. A. Using a surprisemodulated belief update (algorithm 1), the estimated mean (blue) quickly approaches the true mean (dashed red) given observed samples (black circles). A few selected change points are indicated by green arrows. B. The weight factor γ (Eq. 11) (magenta) increases at the change points, resulting in higher influence of newly acquired data samples on the posterior mean. C. The estimation error per time step versus the weight factor 0 ≤ γ ≤ 1 in the delta-rule method with constant γ for four different hazard rates. The minimum estimation error (for best fixed γ) is achieved by a γ (points on the horizontal axis) that decreases with the hazard rate, indicating that a bigger γ is preferred in volatile environments. Error bars indicate standard deviation over all trials and 50 episodes. D. For all models, the average estimation error increases with the hazard rate. Moreover, surprise-modulated belief update (SMile, dark blue) outperforms the delta-rule with the best fixed γ (Best fixed γ, yellow). The best fixed γ for each hazard rate corresponds to the learning rate that has minimal estimation error (indicated by points on the horizontal axis in sub- figure C) . Although the surprise-modulated SMile rule performs worse than the approximate Bayesian delta-rule (10) (App. Bayes, light blue), the difference in the performance is not significant, except for the very small hazard rate of 0.01. At each time step, one of the four available doors (up, down, right, left) in the current room (e.g. s = 6) is randomly opened (with probability 0.25). While the learning agent is in environment A, the environment may change to B with probability P A→B ≤ 0.1 in the next time step of duration ∆t. Similarly, P B→A indicates the environment switches from B to A. Therefore, as the agent starts moving out of state s = 6, depending on the current environment and switch probabilities P A→B and P B→A , it will end up in environment A (i.e., s ∈ {2, 10, 7, 5}) or B (i.e., s ∈ {10, 1, 3, 13}). The duration of a stay in environment A is therefore exponentially distributed with mean τ A = ∆t/P A→B , where the parameter τ A determines the time scale of stability in environment A, i.e., for larger τ A an agent has more time for adapting to A after a change point. The expected fraction of time spent in total within environment A is equal to ψ A = P B→A /(P B→A + P A→B ). Note that τ A and ψ A are two free parameters that we can change to study how the agent performs in different circumstances (e.g., see Fig. 7 Confidence-corrected surprise S corr (3) (green) increases at switch points and decreases (with fluctuations) till the next change point. B. The parameter γ (magenta) increases with the surprise at the change points and causes the next data samples to be more effective on belief update than the samples before the change point. C. The estimation errors for the transition matrixT ,
2 (solid black) and
while in environment A and B, respectively, indicate a rapid adaptation to the new environment after the change points. The dashed black and yellow lines correspond to the estimation errors E A and E B , respectively, when the naive Bayes rule (as a control experiment) is used for belief update. Naive Bayes rule converges to a stationary solution (no significant change in the estimation error after a switch of environment). D. The model uncertainty (light blue) increases for a few time steps following a change of the environment, an alert that the current model might be wrong. It then starts decreasing as the agent becomes more certain in the new environment. for the environment B which has a different topology compared to A. C. The estimated state transition probability matrixT A when the surprise-modulated algorithm 2 is used for belief update.
] is calculated by averaging the estimated transition matrixT [t] at 100 time steps after each of K change points t k B→A . Here, t k B→A denotes the k-th time that the environment is changed from B to A and has remained unchanged for at least the next 100 time steps (relevant time points are indicated by blue diamonds in Fig. 4) . The similarity betweenT A and T A indicates that algorithm 2 enables the agent to quickly adapt to environment A once a switch from B to A occurs. D. The estimated transition matrixT B (similarly defined asT A but for environment B) when algorithm 2 is used for belief update. Note its similarity to the true matrix T B . E-F. The estimated state transition probability matricesT A (up) andT B (down) when the naive Bayesian method (as a control experiment) is used for belief update. A Bayesian agent does not adapt well to the new environment after a switch occurs, because it learns a weighted average of true transition matrices T A and T B , where the weight is proportional to the fraction of time spent in each environment. Since both environments are visited equally in this experiment, the estimated quantities approach (T A + T B )/2. In the early phase of learning (bottom left), the surprise-modulated belief update enables the agent to quickly learn model parameters after a switch to environment A (indicated by red bars). In the late phase of learning (right), however, the online EM algorithm adapts to the new environment faster and more accurately than the surprise-modulated belief update. B. The inferred probability P A of being in environment A (blue, right vertical axis) used in the online EM algorithm, and the confidence-corrected surprise S corr (black, left vertical axis) used in the surprise-modulated belief update. Figure 7 : The estimation error in the maze exploration task, as a function of (1) the average time spent in environment A before a switch to environment B (τ A = ∆t/p A→B , vertical axis) and (2) the fraction of time spent in environment A (ψ A = P B→A /(P B→A + P A→B ), horizontal axis). A. The average estimation error (of state transition probabilities), 64 time steps after a switch from B to A, when surprise-modulated belief update (algorithm 2) is used for learning. The spread of blue color (lower estimation error) illustrates that surprise-modulated belief update enables an agent to quickly adapt to the environment visited after a switch. For each pair (τ A , ψ A ), the simulation is repeated for 20 episodes, each consisting of 20000 time steps. In each episode a different rearrangement of rooms for building environment B is used to make sure that the result is not biased by a specific choice of this environment. B. The average estimation error when the online EM algorithm is used for learning the hierarchical statistical model. C. The average estimation error when naive Bayesian learner is used for belief update. The estimation error for this model is mainly determined by the fraction of time spent in environment A (i.e., ψ A ). The estimation error decreases with the time spent in environment A, regardless of the time scale of stability determined by τ A .
to the primal variable q and maximized with respect to the dual variable λ (i.e., a saddle point must be found). Therefore the constraint problem (6) can be expressed as
By taking the derivative of L with respect to q and setting it equal to zero,
we find that the Lagrangian (13) is minimized by (7), i.e., q(θ) ∝ p(X|θ) γ π 0 (θ) 1−γ , where
is determined by Lagrange multiplier λ. Note that the constant Z(X; γ) in (7) follows from straight normalization of q(θ) to integral one.
Appendix C: The impact of a data sample X on belief update increases with γ in the SMiLe rule.
To prove the statement above we need to show that the impact function ∆S corr (X; L) (5), where L is replaced by the SMiLe rule (7), increases with the parameter γ. In the following we show that the first derivative of the impact function with respect to γ is always non-negative.
But first we need to evaluate the derivative of q γ (θ), Eq. (7), with respect to γ:
Note also that
The derivative of ∆S corr (X, γ) with respect to γ then becomes ∂ ∂γ ∆S corr (X, L(γ)) = − ∂ ∂γ S corr (X, q γ ) 
Appendix D: A larger reduction in the surprise implies a bigger change in belief.
The minimal value of the Lagrangian L(q, λ) (13) that is achieved by the posterior q γ (7), obtained by the SMiLe rule, is equal to L(q γ , λ) 
Note that we used the equality 
Replacing q with π 0 in (21) follows the impact function ∆S corr (X, L) (5) to be, ∆S corr (X, L(γ)) = S corr (X; π 0 ) − S corr (X; q γ ) Appendix E: The SMiLe rule for beliefs described by Gaussian distribution
Suppose we have drawn n − 1 samples X 1 , ..., X n−1 from a Gaussian distribution of known variance σ 2 x , but unknown mean. The empirical mean after n − 1 samples isμ n−1 .
Assume that the current belief about the mean µ is a normal distribution, i.e., π 0 (µ) ∼ N (μ n−1 , σ 2 n−1 ). Since the likelihood of receiving a new sample X n is also normal, i.e., p(X n |µ) ∼ N (µ, σ 2 x ), the posterior belief obtained by the SMiLe rule (7) is
where (σ x ) 2 = σ 2 x /γ and (σ n−1 ) 2 = σ 2 n−1 /(1 − γ). Because the product of two Gaussians is a Gaussian, we arrive at a posterior distribution q γ ∼ N (μ n , σ 2 n ) with the meanμ n = w n X n +
(1 − w n )μ n−1 (with w n = (σ n−1 ) 2 (σ x ) 2 +(σ n−1 ) 2 ), and the variance σ task consists of two sets of unknown parameters: (i) a set P = [P ij ] 2×2 of (unknown) switch probabilities from environment i to j (where we use 1 for environment A and 2 for environment B), and (ii) a set T = [T jss ] 2×16×16 of state transition probabilities, where T jss denotes the probability of transition from state s to state s within environment j. The set of all unknown parameters is denoted by Θ ≡ (P, T).
At each time step t, we estimate the probability q t l = P (E t = l|s 0→t ) of being in environment E t = l ∈ {1, 2}, given all previous state transitions s 0→t = {s 0 , s 1 , ..., s t }. The probability q t l can be recursively calculated bŷ 
where γ 
where ∆ lhs t−1 st ijss = δ(i − l)δ(j − h)δ(s − s t−1 )δ(s − s t ), δ(.) is the Kronecker delta (i.e., 1 when its argument is zero and 0 otherwise), and η is the learning rate.
Finally, the model parameters are updated bŷ 
We emphasize that in order for the online EM algorithm to work properly, some technical considerations must be respected. For instance, in the beginning of learning, only online estimation of Φ must be updated (without updating the model parameters Θ), so that the estimation error for the first 2000 time steps of our simulation in Fig. 6 -A (blue) remains fixed.
